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1. Introduction 
 Does government contribute to or hinder economic growth? This question is of 
considerable interest to economists and is the subject of a large empirical literature. 
However, government is a very broad concept. A more appropriate and tractable question 
is: what kinds of government contribute to or hinder economic growth? To address this 
question, we revisit and extend a number of results from Higgins et al.’s (2006) study of 
US growth determination. In that paper we use county-level data to assess the roles of 
federal, state, and local government, separately, in growth determination from 1970 to 
1998. The analysis focuses on levels of centralization as the relevant kinds of 
government. Nearly all of the evidence that we present in Higgins et al. (2006) suggests 
that government, at any level, hinders economic growth.  Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that government's negative effect on growth diminishes at more decentralized 
levels. 
 In this paper we report how the basic Higgins et al. (2006) findings are largely 
robust to examining (a) subsamples of metro and non-metro counties separately, (b) 
regional subsamples, and (c) individual US state subsamples. We also (d) employ a more 
careful selection of valid instruments for our regressions. The basic findings are again 
robust. We also include documentation that (e) the county-level income distribution 
widened slightly over the 1970 to 1998 period.  
 Our 2006 paper primarily focuses on conditional convergence rates in the US. 
Determinants of balanced growth paths are given second-order treatment in terms of 
detail and space. This paper allows us to highlight findings associated with the 
government employment variable subset of those growth determinants. We find that 
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subset of particular interest and the elaboration of our original findings along the margins 
of (a) through (e) provides, we believe, a stronger and more thorough argument that 
government activities are growth-hindering in the US.     
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the questions of 
interest in terms of the existing literature and how we add to that literature. Section 3 then 
briefly discusses the econometric method and data that we employ. Section 4 discusses 
the empirical findings. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5. 
 
2. Growth and Government: The Existing Literature   
 When asking about kinds of US government there are two complementary (and 
not mutually exclusive) categorizations of interest. One categorization is kinds of 
government services and inputs to production and has received considerable attention in 
the literature. A seminal example is Aschauer (1989) who analyzes government military 
and non-military investment, finding that only non-military government investment is 
positively associated with state-level economic growth. Alternatively, Holtz-Eakin (1994) 
finds that government investment has a negative effect or no effect on gross state product 
(GSP) growth. Evans and Karras (1994) confirm the Holtz-Eakin result even when 
considering investments in highways, water and sewer capital, and other infrastructure 
capital separately.1  However, Evans and Karras also find that increases in government 
educational services are positively related to growth.2 A more recent paper by Shioji 
(2001) revisits the effects of different types of government investment. He finds that the 
                                                 
1
 Garcia-Milà et al. (1996) confirm these results. Lynde and Richmond (1993), to the contrary, use a 
translog production function specification and find that government investment contributes to output 
growth while the government capital stock contributes to productivity growth. 
2
 On the other hand, changes in highway services, health and hospital services, police and fire services, and 
sewer and sanitation services do not have statistically significant effects. 
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infrastructure component has a positive effect on growth.3    
 The categorization we explore – namely kinds of government in terms of the level 
of decentralization – has not received as much attention in the literature. In a sample of 
58 countries, an early paper by Oates (1972) finds that measures of fiscal decentralization 
(henceforth simply decentralization) positively correlate with real income per capita.4 
Davoodi and Zou (1998), on the other hand, find that decentralization is negatively 
associated with growth in developing countries, and not associated with growth in 
developed countries.  
 The literature is especially sparse in regards to the US economy.5 Three notable 
exceptions are Xie et al. (1999) who fail to find a relationship between decentralization 
and per capita income growth from 1948 to 1994 and Akai and Sakata (2002) and Stansel 
(2005) who find positive relationships between decentralization and growth.6 Xie et al. 
(1999) focus on the share of local and state government in aggregate government 
expenditures. Akai and Sakata (2002) analyze expenditure and revenue shares of federal, 
state and local governments in state-level cross-section data. Finally, Stansel (2005) 
                                                 
3
 Different kinds of government services and inputs to production are also a common focus of cross-
country studies. Examples include Atkinson (1995), Slemrod (1995), Agel et al. (1997), Sala-i-Martin 
(1997a and 1997b), and Baldacci et al. (2004). 
4
 Despite Oates (1972) empirical finding, the relationship between economic growth and fiscal 
decentralization in general cannot be directly linked to the more specific “decentralization theorem” put 
forth by Oates in the same work. The decentralization theorem concerns the welfare advantages of 
localized public goods provision in the absence of “cost-savings from centralized provision” and 
“interjurisdictional externalities” (p. 72). The theorem only establishes “a presumption in favor of the 
decentralized provision of public goods with localized effects” (Oates, 1999, p. 1122). Difficult questions 
involve, first, whether this implies a presumption that decentralization positively correlates with growth 
and, second, whether the assumptions underlying that presumption actually hold in a given economy.  
5
 Studies specific to countries other than the US include Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2008) for Spain and 
Zhang and Zhou (1998) for China.  
6
 For succinct overview of fiscal decentralization, see the introduction section of Brueckner (2006). See 
also, Hillman (2003). Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) provides an insightful view of both the 
theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal decentralization. 
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examines the central city share of population, per capita municipalities, and per capita 
counties.  
 Our analysis complements the above studies. We focus on federal, state, and local 
government employment as a percent of a county's population. Our analysis of 
employment shares is novel in terms of both (i) the underlying concept of the public 
sector (or the dimensions of the public sector measured) and (ii) the economic unit of 
analysis (i.e., a county). Employment shares come from the county-level data that 
Higgins et al. (2006, 2008) and Young et al. (2008) exploit to study convergence in the 
US. In contrast to the 48-50 state-level observations, or the 314 metropolitan areas 
studied by Stansel (2005), our data contain over 3,000 county-level observations.  
 Employment shares may provide a better measure of many government activities 
than expenditure shares do. They capture percentages of available labor input that are 
being directed by a specific level of the public sector (rather than by the decisions of 
private individuals and firms). To the extent that economically important government 
activities are labor-intensive, analyzing the effects of employment shares is of interest. 
For example, regulatory environments are presumably inherently labor-intensive in that 
they are not effective without investigative monitoring and enforcement on the ground.7     
 Moreover, the large number of cross-sectional observations allows us to study the 
US as a whole as well as various sub-samples of interest. Metro and non-metro sub-
samples allow for the possibility that government's effect on economic growth varies 
with population density and provides a link to the metro area study of Stansel (2005).  
                                                 
7
 There are, of course, also advantages to expenditure shares relative to employment shares. For 
government activities that are not labor intensive (e.g., industry subsidies) or for which associated labor is 
contracted for from the private sector (e.g., highway construction), expenditure shares may be a more 
appropriate measure.   
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For instance, a higher population density may lead to negative externalities that the public 
sector is uniquely suited to deal with. Furthermore, regional and individual state samples 
(the later of which Higgins et al. 2006 and 2008 do not explore) allow for the possibility 
of heterogeneity of institutions and cultures that are conducive to, or foster, relatively 
good or bad government (in terms of growth-determination). For example, the general 
view of what activities government should pursue may be very different in different 
regions of the country. This carries over to the federal level if individual states request, 
allow, and/or encourage different types of federal activities. In that case, the effects of 
government on growth may be significantly different.   
 Our analysis incorporates 38 variables (as well as state-dummies for the nation-
wide samples) on which to condition the growth rates of per capita income.  These 
variables control for the effects of various levels of educational attainment, age, racial 
demographics, and industry composition.         
 Following Higgins et al. (2006), we use a cross-sectional variant of the 3SLS-IV 
approach of Evans (1997). However, we improve upon Higgins et al. (2006) in terms of 
the instruments used. Higgins et al. (2006) employed lagged values of all conditioning 
variables as instruments. We employ an algorithm that chooses from those lagged values 
a set of instruments that (i) are valid and (ii) have the highest Shea partial R2.  
 
3. Empirical specification and data 
 
In this section we briefly describe the basic growth regression model and the estimation 
technique that we apply. We then briefly describe the US county-level data. Finally, since 
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our estimation technique employs instrumental variables, we describe the algorithm that 
we use to optimally choose a set of instruments conditional on the available data. 
 
3.1. The regression model and 3SLS-IV estimation procedure 
Our growth regressions involve fitting cross-sectional data to the equation,   
(1)  nnnn xyg νγβα +′++= 0 , 
where ng  is the average growth rate of per capita income for economy n between years 0 
and T; yn0 is initial (t = 0) per capita income; nx  is a vector of other control variables 
including government employment shares; β  and γ  are coefficients; and νn is a zero 
mean, finite variance error term.8 Given our data, 0 ≡ 1970 and T ≡ 1998.9
  
 
Caselli, et al. (1996) and Evans (1997) show that applying OLS to (1) will yield 
consistent estimates only if the data satisfy highly implausible conditions.10 Evans (1997) 
proposes a 3SLS-IV method that produces consistent estimates. In the first two stages, 
instrumental variables are used to estimate the regression equation, 
(2)  nnn yg ηβω +∆+=∆ 0 ,       
where 
T
yy
T
yy
g nTnnTnn
)()( 1,1,0,, −− −
−
−
=∆ , 1,00 −−=∆ nnn yyy , ny  , ω is a parameter, 
and nη  is the error.11 ,12  
                                                 
8
 For a derivation of this regression from a neoclassical growth model, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
For exposition of this model in greater detail see Higgins et al. (2006). 
9
 Though the period of growth under consideration is 28 years, the analysis is essentially cross-sectional 
because average growth over those 28 years is the single dependent variable.  
10
  For a list of these conditions see Higgins et al. (2006) and Evans (1997). 
11
  An immediate concern with the use of (2) is the reliance on the information from the single difference in 
the level of income (1969 to 1970) to explain the difference in average growth rates over overlapping time 
periods (1969 to 1997 and 1970 to 1998).  Given that the growth determination is a stochastic process, the 
potential problem is basically one of a high noise to signal ratio.  We are relying on large degrees of 
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Next, we use *β , the estimate from (2), to construct the variable,  
(3)  0* nnn yg βpi −= .        
In the third stage, we perform an OLS regression of npi  on nx : 
(4)  nnn x εγτpi ++= ,        
where τ and γ are parameters and εn is the error term. This regression yields a consistent 
estimator, γ*. 
 
3.2. US county-level data 
 The data we use are drawn from several sources but the majority comes from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Information System (BEA-REIS) and 
US Census data sets. The BEA-REIS data are largely based on the 1970, 1980 and 1990 
decennial Census files; the 1972, 1977, 1982 and 1987 Census of Governments; and the 
Census Bureau’s City and County Book from various years. We exclude military 
personnel from all data. 
 Our data contain 3,058 county-level observations. The large number of 
observations allows us to explore possible heterogeneity in growth across the US by 
splitting the data into three sets of subsamples. The first set includes a metro subsample 
                                                                                                                                                 
freedom to alleviate this problem and identify coefficients.  Indeed, we obtain statistically significant β 
estimates for the full sample as well as for 32 individual states.  
12
  As Evans (1997) shows, the derivation of this equation depends on the assumption that the xn variables 
are constant during the time frame considered, allowing them to be differenced out.  Since the difference is 
only over a single year and these are variables representing broad demographic trends, this does not seem 
to be unwarranted.  To make sure that this did not introduce significant omitted variable bias into our 
estimations, we ran the IV regression for the full US sample with differenced values of all conditioning 
variables included as regressors.  The point estimate of β from the modified IV fell within the 95 percent 
confidence interval of the Evans method IV estimate.  If β estimates are not significantly affected then 
neither are the third stage results (see below). 
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(867 counties) and a non-metro subsample (2,191 counties).13 The second set includes 5 
regional subsamples: Great Lakes, Northeast, Southern, Plains, and Western. Finally, the 
third set includes 50 US state subsamples. 
We use the BEA’s measure of personal income net of government transfers 
expressed in 1992 dollars.  Natural logs of real per capita income are used.  The 38 
conditioning variables are the same as in Higgins et al. (2006, see Table 1) and account 
for various age and racial demographics, levels of educational attainment, and industry 
employment composition.14 For the variables of interest to the present analysis, Table 1 
reports some summary statistics for the various samples of US counties. The variables are 
average per capita income growth from 1970 to 1998 and federal, state, and local 
government employments as a percents of a county's population. 
 
3.3. Choice of Instruments 
 Higgins et al. (2006) used lagged values of conditioning variables as instruments 
for ∆yn,0 in equation (2). A basic criticism of that paper is that no evidence was presented 
of those instruments' validity. It is well-known that a valid set of instruments includes 
variables that are correlated with the endogenous regressors (instrument relevance) but 
uncorrelated with the error term of the regression (instrument orthogonality). For a given 
set of instruments, an F-statistic test can be used to assess the former while 
overidentification tests can be used to assess the latter.   
 In the case of a single endogenous regressor, such as the case with ∆yn,0 in 
equation (2), Staiger and Stock (1997) have suggested declaring instruments to be weak 
                                                 
13
  Metro counties are defined as those that contain cities with populations of 100,000 or more, or border 
such counties (Higgins et al. 2006) 
14
  An appendix at the end of Higgins et al. (2006) describes the data in more detail. 
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(not relevant) if the first-stage F-statistic is less than ten (Stock and Yogo, 2002). This 
“rule of thumb” for testing instrument relevance is supported by Baum et al. (2003). In 
regard to instrument orthogonality, Deaton (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2002) point out 
that when several instruments are used, overidentification tests can be applied. In the 
present case we use Sargan’s (1964) overidentification test to assess whether the 
instruments are correlated with the error process.15 
 Given the size of our sample and number of independent variables we have a 
large number of potential instruments. In order to generate a set of valid instruments (i.e, 
those that address instrument relevance and orthogonality) we apply an algorithm that (i) 
selects various combinations of  available (lagged) conditioning variables such that the 
system is overidentified, (ii) tests their validity, and (iii) if found valid, uses them in the 
regression analysis. Our algorithm does not maximize any particular function but rather 
aids in sifting through all various combinations of valid instruments (i.e., those where the 
first-stage F-statistic is greater than 10 and that satisfy the Sargan test). From this subset 
of valid instruments we selected the set that produced the largest first-stage Shea (1997) 
partial R2, 0.3510. Our final set of instruments consists of the following 13 lagged 
variables: “Age: 18-64 years”, “Education: Bachelor +”, “Federal government 
employment”, “State government employment”, “Local government employment”, “Self-
employment”, “Agriculture”, “Construction”, “Manufacturing: durables”, 
“Manufacturing: non-durables”, “Health services”, “Personal services”, and 
“Entertainment & Recreational Services”.16 
 
                                                 
15
 For Sargan's test see also Wooldridge (2001). 
16
 All of these variables are in terms of percents of a county's population. See Higgins et al. (2006, Table 1) 
for full definitions of these variables and data sources. 
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4. Empirical findings 
 
We begin by presenting our empirical estimates of the effect of federal, state, and local 
government employment (as a percent of a county's population), separately, on US 
economic growth at the county-level. Estimates are presented for (a) country-wide 
samples, including metro and non-metro subsamples, (b) regional subsamples, and (c) 
individual state subsamples. We also informally consider the redistributive role of 
government which may account for the lack of positive growth effects of government 
employment.  
 
4.1. Full US sample results 
 Table 2 presents the estimation results for the full US sample, as well as metro 
and non-metro samples.  We find a negative and statistically significant partial 
correlation between the percent of the population employed by government and the rate 
of economic growth, regardless of whether one considers federal, state or local 
government. The coefficients for federal, state and local government employment percent 
of the population variables are –0.0226, –0.0153, and –0.0219 respectively, all significant 
at the 1-percent level. There is no clear pattern in the point estimates as the level of 
decentralization increases, and the 95 percent confidence intervals of the point estimates 
are overlapping.17   
                                                 
17
 The relationship may, however, be nonlinear. Government expansion may promote growth but only up to 
a point when further expansion is detrimental to growth at the margin; or it may be the case that 
government expansion aims to enhancing growth up to a point, and then expansion beyond that point aims 
at income redistribution (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). To check this, we run the full US sample 
regression including both linear and quadratic government employment share terms. Only for the federal 
employment share is the quadratic term positive and significant, but the parameter estimates imply that the 
marginal effect is negative up until the federal government employs over 30 percent of a county's 
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 The negative effects are also present at all levels of government employment 
whether one considers only metro counties or only non-metro counties as indicated by the 
figures in Table 2.  This suggests that government employment is not positively related 
to economic growth at higher population densities.  Indeed the negative partial 
correlations are larger for the metro sample than for the non-metro sample at all levels. 
Given the apparent robustness of a negative association of government 
employment with growth, one interpretation is that federal, state and local government 
activities misallocate resources into relatively (compared to the private sector) inferior 
production processes. Government lowers total factor productivity, thus lowering 
balanced growth paths. However, another interpretation may be entertained. Perhaps non-
government wage growth outpaces government wage growth, and this drives the 
results.18 These interpretations are not incompatible in a world where both government 
and non-government wages approximated marginal products. However, government 
employment, not being subject to the same market forces, may be different along certain 
intangible margins (e.g., greater job security; lower expectations of effort; higher psychic 
benefits associated with providing a public service).        
In order to explore the above we have assembled government and non-
government wage growth data for the sample period (Table 3). At the state and federal 
level, non-government wages outpace government wages in approximately 55 percent (a 
small majority) of all counties. At the local level, non-government wages grew faster in 
only about 30 percent of counties. Relative sluggishness of government wages at the state 
and federal levels is dominated by wage growth rates in the metro counties. For the non-
                                                                                                                                                 
population; the total effect is negative until it employs over 60 percent! (In the data, however, only 9 out of 
3,058 counties have a federal government employment share in excess of 30 percent.)  
18
  We thank Paul Rubin for bringing this possibility to our attention. 
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metro counties, which constitute a vast majority of 2,196 counties panel, non-government 
wages outpaced government wages in just over 50 percent of cases.19 
 If a relatively sluggish growth of government wages story were important, then 
we would expect to find smaller estimated coefficients for metro counties than for non-
metro counties. This we do see. The coefficient estimates for the regression including 
only metro counties are –0.0300, –0.0264 and –0.0214 for federal, state and local 
governments respectively. For non-metro counties the corresponding estimates are –
0.0179, –0.0081 and –0.0128. Note, however, that this pattern holds for the local 
government coefficients as well, despite local wages outpacing non-government wages in 
a majority of counties. At least at the most decentralized level of government, a relatively 
sluggish government wage growth story is unable to account for the negative partial 
correlation. Indeed, we find a negative relationship despite the relatively fast growth of 
government wages. 
 
4.2. Regional Results and Individual State Results 
  Table 4 reports the results for our five regional sub-samples: Great Lakes, 
Northeastern, Southern, Plains and Western. Statistically significant results are harder to 
come by using these smaller samples, but those significant coefficient estimates are 
broadly consistent with our full sample findings. The significant coefficient estimates are 
all negative except for those associated with the non-metro Plains region. For the non-
metro Plains region, notably, positive effects are estimated for all levels of government. 
The statistically significant coefficient estimates that are negative occur, variously, for 
                                                 
19
   These results are based on data from 3,066 counties. Our regression analysis utilizes data for 3,058 
counties. The difference is due to a lack of some data in eight counties.  
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federal, state, and local government.20    
 Table 5 reports the estimates for 32 of 50 individual US state sub-samples.21  
Again, these results are broadly consistent with the conclusion that government 
employment, at all levels, is negatively correlated with economic growth. Almost all 
statistically significant effects are negative. The notable exception is North Dakota. North 
Dakota has large, statistically significant positive coefficients on federal and local 
government employment.   
 It is not immediately apparent what might be peculiar about North Dakota. For 
example, in 1970, North Dakota ranked 21st highest in terms of federal government 
employment (1.3 percent); 7th in terms of state government employment (2.3 percent); 
and 4th in terms of local government employment (4.7 percent). However, similar to the 
Plains region non-metro case, federal, state, and local government wage growth was 
higher than non-government wage growth in, respectively, about 57 percent, 75 percent, 
and 85 percent of counties. This exceptional government relative wage growth may 
account for the estimated positive effect of government employment on income growth. 
(Of course, this could simply imply that government activity productivity growth was 
relatively high.)           
 
4.3. Redistributive Activities 
 It is possible that the negative correlation between government employment and 
                                                 
20
 The non-metro Plains region effects may be associated with relatively fast government wage growth. 
Federal, state, and local government wage growth, respectively, outpaced non-government wage growth in 
approximately 62 percent, 68 percent, and 80.32 percent of counties. 
21
 Given the extensive number of independent variables, our model was only identified in 32 of 50 states.  
By this we refer to the coefficient on initial income being statistically significant.  In the absence of this the 
interpretation of conditioning variable coefficients is unclear.  
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economic growth is due to the redistributive activities of government. Redistributive 
activities may be detrimental towards average (per capita) income growth though 
effective in their specific goals. Furthermore, if greater income equality is valued in and 
of itself, then trading off growth for equity may be viewed as desirable. 
 Our analysis cannot separate out the productive and redistributive activities of 
federal, state, or local governments. However, under the hypothesis that the negative 
correlation between government employment and economic growth is due to 
redistributive activities, we can ask whether or not the economic growth has indeed been 
traded off for a more equitable distribution of income. In other words, we can evaluate a 
possible redistributive role for the various levels of government given the caveat that we 
can not control for how the distribution of income might have evolved in the absence of 
government. (Clearly this caveat is an important one.)  
 Young et al. (2008) provide evidence on this issue; here we briefly summarize 
their results. Figure 1 displays the 1970 and 1998 distributions of per capita income 
across US states.  The distribution became wider. Also, the Gini coefficients associated 
with US counties' 1970 and 1998 (log) incomes are 0.0167 and 0.0165 respectively – a 
decrease of about 1.2 percent.22 At the county-level, although the dispersion of US per 
capita income widened from 1970 to 1998, it became a bit more equal.23 However, 
changes in both the standard deviation and the Gini coefficient are small enough to 
suggest that changes in both dispersion and equality are negligible.  
To try to understand further the evolution of the US county-level income 
distribution, Table 6 summarizes statistics computed from the 1970 and 1998 income 
                                                 
22
 The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality). 
23
   This statement is not to be confused with one concerning the distribution of US individuals’ incomes. 
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distributions. From 1970 to 1998, the skewness of the distribution increased from -0.2244 
(to the left) to 1.7240 (to the right). At the same time, kurtosis increased from 3.4334 to 
10.3237, implying that the distribution has become more peaked. Cumulatively, this 
suggests that these two effects have been offsetting to a great extent. 
 In conclusion, the evidence presented in Young et al. (2008) does not suggest that 
government activities have achieved (absolutely) a more equal distribution of income at 
the expense of lower rates of economic growth. Put differently, it suggests government 
failure at federal, state, and local levels in lieu of evidence that the distribution of county-
level per capita income would have widened significantly in the absence of government 
activities.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
We use US county data containing over 3,000 cross-sectional observations during the 
period 1970 to 1998 to explore the relationships between economic growth and the size 
and scope of government at three levels: federal, state and local.  In contrast to the extant 
literature that has used taxes, government expenditures and government capital stocks to 
proxy for the extent of government, here we focus on government employment shares.  
 Following Higgins, et al. (2006), we use a 3SLS-IV estimation technique and 
report on the full sample of US counties, as well as metro and non-metro subsamples, and 
5 regional and 32 individual state subsamples.  Federal, state and local government 
employment shares almost always negatively correlate with growth (when statistical 
significance holds) across samples.   
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 We find no evidence that government is more effective at more or less 
decentralized levels.  Furthermore, while we cannot separate out the productive and 
redistributive services of government, we document that income inequality in the US has 
widened slightly from 1970 to1998.  However, the change in both the standard deviation 
of per capita income and the Gini coefficient are small enough to suggest that both 
dispersion and equality remained essentially the same. 
 Given the ostensible goals of higher growth and/or a more equitable distribution 
of income, our findings are not supportive of expanding the roles of government, in terms 
of employment, at any level.  While government is often invoked as a solution to market 
failures, the evidence points to government failure as a more important, and negative, 
influence in the economy. Our findings suggest a rolling back of government activities; 
specifically for a release of government-employed labor inputs to the private sector. 
 The most important and obvious caveat to our findings is that we cannot 
disaggregate government employment into specific government activities, e.g. 
infrastructure development. Despite examining federal, state, and local government 
separately, we must view each level of government as a given package of activities and 
services.  Still, our results are consistent with the conclusion that, as currently composed, 
a shrinking of government at any and all levels of decentralization would be a desireable 
policy.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
      
Samples Counties Growth  Federal  State  Local  
  Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ 
U.S. - Full 3058 0.0154 0.0067 0.0396 0.0402 0.0485 0.0470 0.0835 0.0289 
U.S. - Metro 867 0.0167 0.0062 0.0430 0.0429 0.0495 0.0508 0.0785 0.0233 
U.S. - Non-Metro 2192 0.0149 0.0068 0.0382 0.0389 0.0482 0.0455 0.0855 0.0306 
          
Great Lakes - Full 435 0.0148 0.0045 0.0265 0.0238 0.0404 0.0466 0.0782 0.0220 
Great Lakes - Metro 140 0.0160 0.0045 0.0235 0.0187 0.0349 0.0390 0.0697 0.0109 
Great Lakes - Non-Metro 295 0.0142 0.0044 0.0279 0.0259 0.0430 0.0496 0.0822 0.0247 
          
New England - Full 244 0.0159 0.0050 0.0365 0.0382 0.0513 0.0361 0.0759 0.0209 
New England - Metro 90 0.0166 0.0056 0.0302 0.0206 0.0381 0.0278 0.0793 0.0200 
New England - Non-Metro 154 0.0154 0.0046 0.0401 0.0451 0.0591 0.0381 0.0740 0.0212 
          
Plains - Full 832 0.0139 0.0075 0.0382 0.0388 0.0392 0.0457 0.0979 0.0318 
Plains - Metro 143 0.0171 0.0052 0.0469 0.0548 0.0447 0.0438 0.0857 0.0248 
Plains - Non-Metro 689 0.0133 0.0077 0.0363 0.0343 0.0380 0.0460 0.1004 0.0325 
          
Southern - Full 1009 0.0184 0.0053 0.0414 0.0398 0.0527 0.0435 0.0726 0.0220 
Southern - Metro 252 0.0200 0.0055 0.0486 0.0495 0.0515 0.0503 0.0709 0.0185 
Southern - Non-Metro 757 0.0179 0.0051 0.0390 0.0357 0.0530 0.0410 0.0732 0.0230 
          
Western - Full 538 0.0123 0.0075 0.0503 0.0499 0.0606 0.0558 0.0895 0.0325 
Western - Metro 242 0.0134 0.0065 0.0509 0.0396 0.0627 0.0631 0.0868 0.0284 
Western - Non-Metro 296 0.0114 0.0082 0.0498 0.0571 0.0588 0.0490 0.0916 0.0354 
"Growth" is per capita income growth from 1970 to 1998. Government variables are employment shares of total population. σ is the standard deviation
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Table 2  Estimated effects of government on growth: US-wide samples 
Sample Variable Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Entire US Federal government employment -0.0252a 
(0.0051) 
 State government employment -0.0153a 
(0.0040) 
 Local government employment 
 
-0.0219a 
(0.0052) 
 
Metro counties Federal government employment -0.0305a 
(0.0108) 
 State government employment -0.0249a 
(0.0076) 
 Local government employment 
 
-0.0240a 
(0.0052) 
 
Non-metro counties Federal government employment -0.0206a 
(0.0060) 
 State government employment -0.0056 
(0.0048) 
 Local government employment -0.0145a 
(0.0059) 
Significance levels are indicated by “a” for 1 percent, “b” for 5 percent, and “c” for 10 percent. 
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Table 3  Estimated effects of government on growth: US-wide samples 
Sample Level of government Percent of counties where 
government wages grew faster 
than non-government wages 
Entire US Federal government employment 44.36 
 State government employment 45.37 
 Local government employment 
 
70.35 
Metro counties Federal government employment 34.14 
 State government employment 38.85 
 Local government employment 
 
58.16 
Non-metro counties Federal government employment 48.41 
 State government employment 47.95 
 Local government employment 75.18 
Non-government wages are the sum of private and farm wages.
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Table 4  Estimated effects of government on growth: US regional samples 
Sample Variable Coefficient 
(Stand. error) 
 
Great Lakes 
 
 
 
Northeast 
 
 
 
Plains 
 
 
 
Southern 
 
 
 
Western 
Number of 
Counties 
 435 244 832 1,009 538 
Entire US 
 
Federal -0.0086 
(0.0159) 
-0.0263 
(0.0212) 
-0.0223b 
(0.0101) 
-0.0241a 
(0.0091) 
-0.0149 
(0.0109)
 State -0.0211b 
(0.0100) 
-0.0118 
(0.0139) 
0.0100 
(0.0075) 
-0.0048 
(0.0076) 
-0.0104 
(0.0097)
 Local 
 
-0.0377a 
(0.0135) 
-0.0372 
(0.0271) 
0.0031 
(0.0084) 
0.0036 
(0.0113) 
-0.0309a
(0.0119)
Number of 
Counties 
 140 90 143 252 242 
Metro Federal 0.0109 
(0.0344) 
0.0195 
(0.0345) 
-0.0121 
(0.0286) 
-0.0392b 
(0.0211) 
-0.0117 
(0.0219)
 State -0.0203 
(0.0214) 
-0.0162 
(0.0288) 
-0.0358b 
(0.0154) 
-0.0166 
(0.0180) 
-0.0163 
(0.0158)
 Local 
 
-0.0325 
(0.0398) 
-0.1024c 
(0.0571) 
-0.0086 
(0.0225) 
0.0067 
(0.0353) 
-0.0391c
(0.0221)
Number of 
Counties 
 295 154 689 757 296 
Non-metro Federal 0.0055 
(0.0201) 
-0.0286 
(0.0260) 
0.0187c 
(0.0102) 
-0.0158 
(0.0104) 
-0.0104 
(0.0147)
 State -0.0238b 
(0.0120) 
0.0024 
(0.0158) 
0.0161c 
(0.0092) 
-0.0035 
(0.0086) 
-0.0066 
(0.0151)
 Local 
 
-0.0356b 
(0.0151) 
-0.0453 
(0.0345) 
0.0187c 
(0.0102) 
0.0096 
(0.0118) 
-0.0335c
(0.0171)
Significance levels are indicated by “a” for 1 percent, “b” for 5 percent, and “c” for 10 percent. 
 
  
 
24  
TABLES (Cont.) 
 
Table 5  Estimated effects of government on growth: individual US state samples 
State Coefficient (std. err.) 
 
Federal 
 
 
State 
 
 
Local 
Alabama 0.0383       (0.0543) -0.0130   (0.0482) 0.0377    (0.0536) 
Arkansas -0.0153   (0.0499) -0.0435   (0.0364) -0.0385   (0.0443) 
California 0.0337c   (0.0292) 0.0275    (0.0399) 0.0334    (0.0651) 
Colorado -0.0631c  (0.0358) -0.0627   (0.0420) -0.0224   (0.0361) 
Florida 0.0254    (0.0740) 0.0039    (0.0560) -0.0217   (0.0868) 
Georgia -0.0094   (0.0353) 0.0038    (0.0235) 0.0149    (0.0302) 
Idaho -0.1187c  (0.0569) 0.0439    (0.0331) 0.0453    (0.0685) 
Illinois 0.0403    (0.0328) -0.0101   (0.0189) -0.0011   (0.0239) 
Indiana -0.0695   (0.0498) 0.0025    (0.0231) -0.0357   (0.0351) 
Iowa 0.0633     (0.0398) -0.0479b  (0.0207) 0.0269    (0.0283) 
Kansas 0.0272     (0.0413) 0.0157    (0.0169) 0.0119    (0.0175) 
Kentucky -0.0189   (0.0226) -0.0037   (0.0200) -0.0075   (0.0261) 
Louisiana -0.0182   (0.0376) -0.0207   (0.0353) -0.1758a  (0.0633) 
Michigan 0.0714     (0.0492) -0.0629b  (0.0270) -0.0331   (0.0341) 
Minnesota -0.0384   (0.0604) -0.0102   (0.0232) -0.0247   (0.0237) 
Mississippi 0.0060     (0.0630) -0.0525   (0.0488) -0.1657a  (0.0614) 
Missouri -0.1032a  (0.0348) -0.0779a  (0.0264) -0.0194   (0.0324) 
Montana -0.1149   (0.0718) -0.0422   (0.0474) -0.0161   (0.0478) 
New York 0.0942     (0.1194) 0.0518     (0.0439) 0.0077    (0.0669) 
North Carolina -0.2145a  (0.0694) -0.0621b  (0.0309) -0.0165   (0.0682) 
North Dakota 0.2524c    (0.1416) 0.1183     (0.1023) 0.2537b   (0.1173) 
Ohio -0.0233   (0.0569) -0.0316   (0.0235) -0.0205   (0.0470) 
Oklahoma -0.1013c  (0.0529) -0.0654c  (0.0352) -0.0903b  (0.0370) 
Pennsylvania 0.0170     (0.0613) 0.0252     (0.0258) -0.1347b  (0.0605) 
South Carolina -0.0169   (0.0795) -0.0692   (0.0957) -0.0189   (0.1069) 
South Dakota -0.0297   (0.0458) 0.0093     (0.0342) -0.0410   (0.0439) 
Tennessee -0.0039   (0.0360) -0.0731b  (0.0361) 0.0072    (0.0390) 
Texas -0.0442   (0.0301) 0.0035     (0.0174) -0.0285   (0.0214) 
Virginia -0.0161   (0.0411) -0.0139   (0.0427) 0.0218    (0.0539) 
Washington -0.0295   (0.0651) -0.0662   (0.1226) -0.1478   (0.2310) 
West Virginia 0.0858     (0.0717) 0.0146     (0.0354) -0.0255   (0.0811) 
Wisconsin 0.0156     (0.0332) -0.0199   (0.0311) 0.0466    (0.0348) 
Significance levels are indicated by “a” for 1 percent, “b” for 5 percent, and “c” for 10 percent. 
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Table 6  Summary statistics for the distribution of US county (log) per-capita income 
Statistic 1970 1998 
Standard deviation 0.2728 0.2887 
Gini Coefficient 0.1666 0.1654 
Skewness -0.2244 1.7240 
Kurtosis 3.4334 10.3237 
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Fig. 1   Distribution of US county (log) per-capita incomes, 1970 and 1998 
 
